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"YOU'VE GOT MAIL!" DECODING THE BITS AND BYTES OF
FOURTH AMENDMENT COMPUTER SEARCHES AFTER
ACKERMAN
ABSTRACT
In the digital age, courts have been searching for rational solutions
and definitions regarding computer searches that comport with current
Fourth Amendment law, specifically the private search doctrine. Recent-
ly, in United States v. Ackerman, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit held that when a government entity or agent opens and examines
emails previously unopened by private actors, they have conducted a
"search" to which the Fourth Amendment applies. Although the ultimate
holding is consistent with the Fourth Amendment's reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy doctrine, the Tenth Circuit offered a controversial alterna-
tive rationale rooted in the trespass-to-chattels doctrine. This alternative
rationale has far-reaching implications, specifically regarding the viabil-
ity of the private search doctrine as applied to computer searches.
This Comment first argues that courts should adopt a "file" ap-
proach in Fourth Amendment cases involving searches of computers
rather than the previously proposed "physical device" and "human ob-
servation" approaches. A person who leaves a file open on a computer
does not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in the open file, but
a person does possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in closed files.
Secondly, this Comment argues that the reintroduction of the trespass-to-
chattels limb of Fourth Amendment searches will practically extinguish
the private search doctrine as applied to computers, unless courts adopt a
different definition of "trespass," specifically a definition anchored in the
unit of a computer file. The abstract concept of a computer file is analo-
gous to the "metes and bounds" of physical property, and the data con-
tained within the file is analogous to the property contained within said
physical metes and bounds. Under both the reasonable expectation of
privacy and trespass-to-chattels doctrines, focusing on the unit of a com-
puter "file" is the most favorable approach. In short, opening a file on a
computer should be considered a distinct search under the Fourth
Amendment and therefore should require a distinct justification.
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INTRODUCTION
As technology continues to rapidly advance and become more inte-
grated in our day-to-day lives, computer evidence will increasingly be-
come more valuable and pertinent in both civil and criminal investiga-
tions. Computer forensic examination is now a common tool in almost all
criminal investigations.' To support this tool, the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation (FBI) alone has over two hundred full-time computer forensic
examiners.2 However, computer forensic examination continues to gen-
erate unnecessary Fourth Amendment complications. Because most
modem-day computers possess storage capacities from anywhere be-
tween 250 gigabytes to several terabytes,3 the application of the Fourth
Amendment becomes problematic. In light of their "immense storage
capacit[ies]"4 and ability to store and transport "millions of pages of text,
thousands of pictures, or hundreds of videos," electronic devices are
quantitatively different from physical spaces. Electronic records, unlike
physical records, possess an "element of pervasiveness" because elec-
tronic records can be transferred among devices around the world in mil-
liseconds whereas physical records cannot.6 Furthermore, electronic de-
1. Josh Goldfoot, The Physical Computer and the Fourth Amendment, 16 BERKELEY J.
CRIM. L. 112,112 (2011).
2. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CHILD EXPLOITATION
PREVENTION AND INTERDICTION 131 (2010).
3. See Kim Komando, How Much Computer Storage Do You Really Need?, USA TODAY
(Nov. 30, 2012, 7:51 AM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/columnist/komando/2012/11/30/komando-computer-
storage/I 726835; Lucas Mearian, With Tech Breakthrough, Seagate Promises 60TB Drives this
Decade, COMPUTERWORLD (Mar. 20, 2012, 11:58 AM),
https://www.computerworld.com/article/2502838/data-center/with-tech-breakthrough--seagate-
promises-60tb-drives-this-decade.html.
4. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014).
5. See id.




vices are qualitatively different than physical spaces because data stored
on electronic devices may include "private information never found in a
home in any form."7 For example, consider an electronic device's persis-
tent tracking of Global Positioning System (GPS) location data or artifi-
cial intelligence algorithms that determine a user's social profile and
preferences. Such private information rarely exists in physical form in a
home because displaying this information on a tangible medium requires
printing tens of thousands of pages.8
The Fourth Amendment is heavily premised on physical objects and
was drafted to regulate searches of homes and physical property.9 Until
the Warren Court, judicial interpretation of the Fourth Amendment pro-
tected only against physical intrusions on tangible things.10 This purely
physical conception of the Fourth Amendment's protections changed
with the seminal decision of Katz v. United States," where the Court
replaced property-based theories with a two-part "expectation of priva-
cy" test.12 According to Katz, a search under the Fourth Amendment oc-
curs when a governmental employee or agent of the government violates
an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy.13 However, because
the Fourth Amendment applies only to governmental employees and
agents, the Fourth Amendment is not triggered when private parties con-
duct searches.14 The Supreme Court established the "private search doc-
trine" to regulate what law enforcement is allowed to see without com-
plying with the strictures of the Fourth Amendment."5 The private search
doctrine allows police and law enforcement officials to reconstruct the
private party search and see what the private party saw, but police and
7. Id. at 2491.
8. 1.4 gigabytes (GB) is equivalent to 105,000 pages. 5.8 GB is equivalent to 435,000 pages.
5,200 GB is equivalent to 390,000,000 pages. See Data Volume Estimates and Conversions, SDS
DISCOVERY, http://www.sdsdiscovery.com/resources/data-conversions (la t visited May 30, 2017);
see also ERICSSON, ERICSSON MOBILITY REPORT: ON THE PULSE OF THE NETWORKED SOCIETY 2
(2016) (total monthly mobile data traffic per smartphone was 1.4 GB in 2015; total monthly mobile
data traffic per mobile PC was 5.8 GB in 2015); see also International Data Corporation, The Digital
Universe in 2020: Big Data, Bigger Digital Shadows, and Biggest Growth in the Far East, EMC
(Dec. 2012), https://www.emc.com/leadership/digital-universe/2012iview/executive-summary-a-
universe-of htm (the digital universe will exceed 40 trillion GB, which is "5,200 GB for every man,
woman, and child").
9. See Orin S. Kerr, Digital Evidence and the New Criminal Procedure, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
279, 290-92 (2005).
10. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (noting that no precedents permit the
Fourth Amendment to apply as a viable defense in cases where no official search and seizure of the
person, his papers, tangible material effects, or an actual physical invasion of property had occurred),
overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
11. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
12. Id. at 353.
13. Id at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (articulating the test commonly associated with
Katz); see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, hous-
es, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
14. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
15. Id. at 115-16.
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law enforcement may not exceed the scope of the private party search
without triggering the Fourth Amendment.16 A private search extin-
guishes an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy in the object
searched;'7 once this has occurred, the Fourth Amendment does not pro-
hibit governmental use of this non-private information.' By merely re-
peating the search, the government does not further infringe on a per-
son's privacy.19 Unsurprisingly, the private search doctrine's application
to electronic devices has caused controversy within federal courts.20
Although this privacy rationale has been the touchstone of Fourth
Amendment searches for almost fifty years, in 2012, United States v.
Jones21 supplemented the reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine by
reintroducing the trespass doctrine.22 If an individual does not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy, a governmental employee or agent
may still trigger a Fourth Amendment "search" by trespassing onto that
individual's property in order to obtain information.23 With regard to the
private search doctrine, even though a police officer accurately repeated
a prior private search, the police officer's repeated search would qualify
as a "trespass" under Jones and therefore a distinct search under the
Fourth Amendment. Thus, the prior private party search becomes irrele-
vant under a Jones trespass-to-chattels analysis, which inevitably chal-
lenges the continued viability of the private search doctrine as applied to
computers.24
This Gomment explores both the history and future of Fourth
Amendment computer searches in light of the Tenth Circuit's recent rul-
ing in United States v. Ackerman25 and concludes by proposing a simple
framework for administering the Fourth Amendment that preserves the
private search doctrine regarding computers. This Comment will argue
that by adopting a "file" framework for defining computer searches, both
16. Id. at 115-20.
17. Id.atll7.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 120.
20. Compare United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 464 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that police
did not exceed the scope of the private party's search by opening and viewing additional files on
CDs), and Rann v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 832, 838 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that police did not exceed
scope of the private party's search after opening and searching previously unopened files on a zip
drive), with United States v. Lichtenberger (Lichtenberger 1), 786 F.3d 478, 491 (6th Cir. 2015)
(holding that police exceeded the scope of the private party's search when files were opened on the
same device that had not been searched earlier), and United States v. Sparks, 806 F.3d 1323, 1335
(11th Cir. 2015) (holding that police exceeded the scope of the private party's search when previous-
ly unopened images and a video were searched on the same device).
21. 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
22. Id. at 405-06 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)) (discussing the
trespass rule).
23. Id. at 407-08.
24. See, e.g., Andrew MacKie-Mason, The Private Search Doctrine After Jones, 126 YALE
L.J. F. 326, 330 (2017) ("[E]ven if a particular action passes Jacobsen's test (and is thus not a search
under Katz), it may still be a search under Jones.").
25. 831 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 2016).
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the reasonable expectation of privacy prong and the trespass-to-chattels
prong of Fourth Amendment searches will be satisfied.
Part I of this Comment traces the history of the Fourth Amend-
ment's application to computers and details the significant differences
between searching a computer and searching a physical space. Part I also
summarizes the recent federal circuit split regarding the application of
the Fourth Amendment's private search doctrine to computers. The Fifth
Circuit26 and the Seventh Circuit27 both subscribe to the "physical de-
vice" approach: if a private party accessed even just one file on a com-
puter, the entire computer was searched by that private party, and there-
fore, the police can access the entire computer without conducting a
search to which the Fourth Amendment applies. By contrast, the Sixth
Circuit28 and Eleventh Circuit29 both subscribe to a data or "file" ap-
proach: if a private party searched one file on a computer, only that file
can be searched by the police. The latter decisions from the Sixth and
Eleventh circuits trigger several questions about he file approach.3 0 For
example, if the private party only viewed one file on the computer,
should the police be limited to searching only that single file, or should
the police be allowed to search other files contained within the same
folder? Is a folder a file? If a private party observed only part of a file on
the screen, should the police be allowed to search the remaining contents
of that file (e.g., scrolling through a Word document)? Part I of this
Comment will also discuss the reintroduction of the trespass-to-chattels
definition of a Fourth Amendment search and the implications of that
paradigm shift for the private search doctrine.
Part II of this Comment provides a brief summary of the facts, opin-
ions, and holdings of Ackerman. Part III first analyzes the Tenth Circuit's
reasoning in Ackerman, with a particular emphasis on the alternative
holding.31 The last half of Part III endorses the file framework for admin-
istering the Fourth Amendment in computer searches. It explains why the
file approach is superior to previously-considered approaches and also
why the file approach is the most appropriate framework in light of
Ackerman, Jones, and United States v. Jacobsen.32 Furthermore, if courts
continue to recognize property rights in data, applying the file approach
26. Runyan, 275 F.3d at 464.
27. Rann v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 832, 838 (7th Cir. 2012).
28. Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d 478, 490-91 (6th Cir. 2015).
29. United States v. Sparks, 806 F.3d 1323, 1335 (1lth Cir. 2015).
30. See Orin Kerr, 11th Circuit Deepens the Circuit Split on Applying the Private Search
Doctrine TO Computers, WASH. POST (Dec. 2, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/12/02/11th-circuit-deepens-the-
circuit-split-on-applying-the-private-search-doctrine-to-computers (noting that the deepening circuit
split regarding the application of the private search doctrine to computers is ripe for Supreme Court
review).
31. See infra text accompanying notes 211-14.
32. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
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to Fourth Amendment computer searches emerges as the preeminent
logical framework.
I. BACKGROUND
The dawn of the digital age has produced a wide range of new
Fourth Amendment complications. Not only have courts been faced
with privacy concerns regarding electronic devices, but they also have
been forced to consider the ever-increasing storage capacities of comput-
ers and smartphones.34 Section A details the history of Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence, the Court's doctrine regarding information previous-
ly accessed by private parties, and its application to electronic devices.
Section B focuses on the current federal circuit split regarding the con-
tours of the private search doctrine's application to computers. Finally,
Section C discusses the trespass-to-chattels doctrine under Jones and its
impact on the private search doctrine under Jacobsen.
A. The Fourth Amendment in the Digital Age
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects citizens
from unreasonable searches and seizures of their "person, houses, papers,
and effects."35 Current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence defines a search
in one of two ways. Since the Supreme Court's 1967 decision in Katz, a
search occurs when a governmental employee or agent of the govern-
ment violates an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy.3 6 In
2012, the Supreme Court supplemented the Katz "reasonable expectation
of privacy" doctrine by reintroducing the trespass doctrine. Under the
Jones trespass doctrine, a trespass into an individual's property consti-
tutes a Fourth Amendment search.38 Thus, even in the absence of a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy, the government may still trigger the
Fourth Amendment if it trespasses into a person's property.
One way the Fourth Amendment grants government agents the
power to conduct reasonable searches is after receiving a proper war-
rant.3 9 Besides a growing list of exceptions,4 0 warrantless searches and
33. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480 (2014) (analyzing constitutionality of
searching cell phone data after arrest); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402 (2012) (analyzing
whether attaching a GPS device to defendant's vehicle was a trespass under the Fourth Amendment);
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001) (analyzing constitutionality of using a thermal imag-
ing device from a public street to scan a private home).
34. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489 (discussing the ever-increasing storage capacities of electron-
ic devices).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
36. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
37. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 412 (2012).
38. See id.
39. See id. at 406-07.
40. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009) (allowing a search incident to lawful
arrest); see also Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 130 (1990) (allowing a plain view exception to
the Fourth Amendment); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990) (allowing a search "when
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seizures are unreasonable on their face.41 When determining whether to
exempt a search from the warrant requirement, courts have generally
attempted to conduct a balancing assessment between an individual's
privacy and the government's interest in gathering evidence.42 However,
these Fourth Amendment protections only apply to governmental entities
or agents.43 An unreasonable search or seizure conducted by a private
individual is exempt from the aforementioned limitations unless the indi-
vidual who conducted the search was acting under the direction of a gov-
ernment official or agent.44 In Jacobsen, the U.S. Supreme Court articu-
lated the private search reconstruction doctrine (private search doc-
trine).45 Under the private search doctrine, when a private party's search
violates a person's privacy, a government agent's warrantless search
does not violate the Fourth Amendment if it simply replicates the same
46search already conducted by the private party. The rationale is that a
private search extinguishes an individual's reasonable expectation of
privacy.47 Furthermore, the private search doctrine allows a government
official to conduct a follow-up search within the scope of the initial
search;48 however, if the government exceeds that scope, then its search
will be in violation of the Fourth Amendment.4 9
Jacobsen involved a search of a package by a government agent af-
ter Federal Express (FedEx) employees intercepted and searched the
same package upon noticing the presence of a suspicious white powder.o
In addition to replicating the search conducted by the FedEx employees,
a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent also tested the white powder
and identified the powder as cocaine.51 The FedEx employees only
searched the package but did not test the white powder.52 Based on the
field test results from the DEA agent and other supporting evidence, the
DEA obtained a warrant to search the addressee's home.53 The DEA
voluntary consent has been obtained"); Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466-67 (1999) (allowing
a motor vehicle exception to the Fourth Amendment).
41. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 ("[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment .... ).
42. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) ("[W]e generally determine whether to
exempt a given type of search from the warrant requirement 'by assessing, on the one hand, the
degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is
needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests."') (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton,
526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
43. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (explaining that Fourth Amend-
ment limitations only apply to governmental searches and seizures).
44. Id. (explaining that Fourth Amendment protections do not apply to unreasonable searches
by private persons).
45. Id. at 117-18.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 115.
49. See id. at 117-18.
50. Id. at 111.
51. Id. at II1-12.
52. Id.
53. United States v. Jacobsen, 683 F.2d 296, 298 (8th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
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subsequently found more incriminating evidence and arrested Jacobsen.54
After denying Jacobsen's motion to suppress the evidence, the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of Minnesota convicted Jacobsen of possession
with intent to distribute cocaine and conspiracy to distribute cocaine.
Jacobsen appealed the district court decision, and the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the DEA agents' field test of the
white powder expanded the scope of the private search and thus required
56a warrant. The Eighth Circuit reversed Jacobsen's convictions, and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.5 7 The Court adopted the "virtual cer-
tainty" test, which states that to determine whether the government's
search exceeded the scope of the initial private search, courts must con-
duct a balancing test between the amount of information the government
stands to gain and the level of certainty regarding what they will find.5 8 If
the officer is "virtually certain[]" that nothing new will be discovered,
then the government's search is within the scope of the initial search.59
Applying the virtual certainty standard specifically to the DEA agents'
field tests, the Court reasoned that the suspicious nature of the white
powder made it "virtually certain" that it was some sort of contraband.60
In short, the government's apparent search was no search at all for
Fourth Amendment purposes because it compromised no "legitimate
privacy interest."6 1
Since Jacobsen, courts have focused on the nature of the area being
searched when applying the virtual certainty test.62 For example, in Unit-
ed States v. Allen,6 3 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit de-
64clined to extend the private search doctrine to a search of a motel room.
The Sixth Circuit distinguished its holding from Jacobsen, citing the
material differences between a suspicious package and a motel room.65 In
balancing individual privacy interests with the government's interest in
obtaining evidence, the court noted that the package in Jacobsen con-
tained only contraband, whereas the motel contained numerous other
personal possessions irrelevant to the search.
More recently in Riley v. California,67 the U.S. Supreme Court
made an effort to protect data privacy.68 After police pulled over defend-
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 299-300.
57. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 12-13.
58. Id. at 119.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 124-25.
61. Id. at 123.
62. See United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 699 (6th Cir. 1997).
63. 106 F.3d 695 (6th Cir. 1997).
64. Id. at 699.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
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ant Riley for a minor traffic infraction, the police searched his phone,
revealing gan -related content that tied Riley to a shooting that occurred
weeks prior. 9 The government argued that permitting warrantless
searches of cell phones incident to arrest could ultimately prevent de-
struction of evidence and aid law enforcement officers.70 The Supreme
Court rejected this argument, reasoning that cell phones represent an
important privacy interest that must be protected because of the signifi-
cant volumes of personal information contained within them.71 To pro-
tect this privacy interest, the Court held that police officers must obtain a
72warrant before searching a cell phone. The cellphone in Riley is akin to
the motel room in the Allen case: They both contain numerous pieces of
information that may be irrelevant to the search.
To summarize, under the reasonable expectation of privacy defini-
tion of a Fourth Amendment search, a search occurs when "[t]he Gov-
ernment's activities ... violate[] the privacy upon which [a person] justi-
fiably relie[s]."74 However, the Supreme Court has carved out an excep-
tion to this definition-the private search doctrine. Under the private
search doctrine, once a private party conducts an initial search, the gov-
ernment may repeat that search without triggering a Fourth Amendment
"search."76 With the development of new technology and exponentially
increasing storage capacities, applying the private search doctrine to
electronic devices has raised unforeseen difficulties and caused splin-
tered decisions.
B. The Private Search Doctrine Circuit Split
Recent circuit court decisions regarding the private search doctrine
as applied to computers have led to a circuit split.77 The split among the
circuit courts is rooted in disagreement over the appropriate measuring
unit to apply when searching computers:7 8 When a private party has
68. Id. at 2494-95.
69. People v. Riley, No. D059840, 2013 WL 475242, at *1-2 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2013),
rev'd, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
70. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2486.
71. Id. at 2494-95.
72. Id. at 2495.
73. Compare United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 699 (6th Cir. 1997) (remarking that a
motel room contains several personal possessions that may be outside the scope of a private search),
with Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494-95 (noting that cell phones may contain several "privacies of life" that
may be outside the scope of a private search).
74. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (emphasis added).
75. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117-18 (1984).
76. Id.
77. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
78. Compare United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 464 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that the
entire physical device was searched), and Rann v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 832, 838 (7th Cir. 2012)
(holding that the entire physical device was searched), with Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d 478, 491 (6th
Cir. 2015) (holding that only the files opened were searched), and United States v. Sparks, 806 F.3d
1323, 1335 (11 th Cir. 2015) (holding that only the files opened were searched), and United States v.
Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1305-06 (10th Cir. 2016).
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searched a file on a computer, what exactly has been searched? Has the
entire computer been searched? Or has the visible part of the file on the
screen only been searched? Or has the entire file itself been searched,
regardless if it was displayed in its entirety on the screen? These ques-
tions are significant for computer searches, as the answers provide the
extent to which government officials are allowed to search a computer
absent a warrant after a private citizen has already searched the comput-
er.
In 2001, in United States v Runyan,79 the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit considered the application of the private search doctrine
to digital storage devices containing child pornography.s0 While in the
process of moving her things out of the home pending a divorce with her
husband, the wife of defendant Robert Runyan discovered CDs and zip
disks81 that contained pornographic images of minors.82 She turned over
the CDs and zip disks to the police, and Runyan was indicted on child
pornography charges.83 Runyan moved to suppress the evidence on the
digital storage devices that the law enforcement personnel searched
without a warrant.84 However, the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Texas denied his motion on the grounds that the police had
not exceeded the scope of his wife's initial search.
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the court assumed that a computer
disk is a closed container in the context of analyzing a warrantless search
under the Fourth Amendment.8 6 Accordingly, when police officers exam-
ine more items of a container than were previously viewed during a pri-
87vate search, the officers do not exceed the scope of the initial search.
Thus, when the police officers searched the storage devices, they did not
exceed the scope of the private search, even though they opened files on
the storage devices previously unopened by Runyan's wife.8 8 Here, the
Fifth Circuit used a physical device measuring unit when reconstructing
the private search: because the digital storage device had already been
opened and examined to some extent by a private party, the police offic-
ers were free to reopen and search all the contents of the digital storage
device.89
79. 275 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 2001).
80. See id. at 456.
81. Zip Disk, PC MAG.: ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/55217/zip-disk (last visited Mar. 30, 2017) (providing a
definition of zip disk).
82. Runyan, 275 F.3d at 452-53.
83. Id. at 454-55.
84. Id. at 455.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 464 (treating the computer disk as a closed container).
87. Id at 465.




Similarly, in 2012, in Rann v. Atchison,90 the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit held that a more thorough search of a zip drive
did not exceed the scope of the previous private search.91 Defendant
Rann was charged with sexual assault and child pornography involving
his then-fifteen-year-old daughter.9 2 Rann's wife and daughter turned
over to police a memory card and a zip drive containing pornographic
images of the daughter and another minor.93 It appeared to the court that
Rann's wife had downloaded the images to the zip drive herself.94 Even
though Rann's wife only visibly searched through a few of the files on
the zip drive she compiled, the court held that the police's more exhaus-
tive follow-up search of the zip drive did not exceed the scope of the
initial search.95 The court reasoned that because the police were certain
that nothing new would be discovered during the follow-up search, the
96scope of the follow-up search had not been exceeded. Indeed, the court
could not "imagine more conclusive evidence that [the defendant's
daughter] and her mother knew exactly what the memory card and the
zip drive contained."97
In 2015, in United States v. Lichtenberger,98 the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit declined to adopt the physical device (or
"closed container") approach of the Fifth and Seventh circuits.99 Instead,
the Sixth Circuit held that police officers exceeded the scope of the prior
private search by opening and examining files on the same physical de-
vice that the private party searched, but that may not have been viewed
by the private party.00 Defendant Lichtenberger's girlfriend suspected
Lichtenberger of possessing child pornography on his computer.'0 Of
her own volition, the girlfriend hacked into Lichtenberger's computer
using a password recovery program and eventually discovered a folder
containing child pornography.102 The girlfriend contacted the police, and
an officer arrived at the house and requested that the girlfriend show him
what she had found.10 3 The girlfriend "opened several folders and began
90. 689 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 2012).
91. Id. at 838.
92. Id. at 834.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 837.
95. Id. at 838.
96. Id. (adopting the "substantial certainty" language used in Runyan).
97. Id.
98. 786 F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2015).
99. See Orin Kerr, Sixth Circuit Creates Split on Private Search Doctrine for Computers,
WASH. POST (May 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/201 5/05/20/sixth-circuit-creates-circuit-split-on-private-search-doctrine-for-
computers (arguing that the Sixth Circuit took the correct approach).
100. Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d at 490-91.
101. United States v. Lichtenberger (Lichtenberger 1), 19 F. Supp. 3d 753, 755 (N.D. Ohio





clicking on random thumbnail images to show him." 04 A warrant was
later obtained to search the entire computer, but in later criminal pro-
ceedings for possession and distribution of child pornography, Lichten-
berger moved to suppress all evidence found on his computer because his
then-girlfriend testified that she was not sure the files she showed the
police officers were the exact same files she viewed during her private
search.105 Obviously, the same physical device had been searched, but it
was not clear that the same files had been searched.10 6
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio suppressed
the evidence, finding that the private search doctrine did not apply. 07
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, holding that the
police officer exceeded the scope of the prior search because he viewed
files that may have differed from those viewed by the private party.1os
Reiterating the concerns from Riley v. California,109 the Sixth Circuit
focused on the unique storage capabilities and inevitable privacy inter-
ests posed by digital storage devices, concluding that the "virtual certain-
ty" threshold was not met due to the nature of the electronic device."o
The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the police officer was not virtually cer-
tain of what he was to discover on Lichtenberger's computer because the
files could not have been viewed without first clicking on them. i The
Sixth Circuit further remarked that "[o]ther documents, such as bank
statements or personal communications, could also have been discovered
among the photographs."" 12 In short, the Sixth Circuit created a split with
the Fifth and Seventh circuits by rejecting the physical device unit of
measurement and adopting a file or "data" unit of measurement.' 3
More recently, in United States v. Sparks, 114 the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit adopted the file or data unit of measure-
ment, which brought the circuit split to 2-2 with regard to how the pri-
vate search doctrine should apply to computers.'5 In Sparks, defendants
Johnson and Sparks left their cellphone at a Wal-Mart where a Wal-Mart
employee opened it and looked through its contents.'6 The employee
found hundreds of disturbing images and videos of child pornography.' 17
104. Id.
105. Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d at 481.
106. See id.
107. Lichtenberger I, 19 F. Supp. 3d at 758-59.
108. Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d at 490-91.
109. 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014) (focusing on the significant privacy interests at stake).
110. Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d at 488 (citing Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489) (discussing unique
privacy concerns posed by electronic devices).
111. Id. at 481, 489 (noting that the main folder was labeled "private" and sub-folders were
"labeled with numbers not words").
112. Id. at 489.
113. See id. at 489-91.
114. 806 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2015).
115. See supra notes 20, 78 and accompanying text.
116. Sparks, 806 F.3d at 1329.
117. Id. at 1330-31.
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The employee told her fianc6, Widner, about the images and videos."1 8
Widner searched through the phone, opening a few images and watching
one video.' 19 Widner then contacted the police, turned over the phone,
and showed the officers what he had seen.120 Subsequently, one of the
police officers searched the entire phone-opening all the images to full
size and watching a second video that Widner had not viewed.121
The Eleventh Circuit held that (1) the police officer who searched
the entire phone did not exceed the scope of Widner's private search
when he viewed the same images (including thumbnails) and one video
that Widner had previously viewed; but (2) the police officer did exceed
the scope of Widner's private search when he opened and viewed images
and a second video that Widner had not watched.12 2 They made this hold-
ing despite the fact that the second video was located within the same
folder as the first video.12 3 Although the "private search of the cell phone
might have removed certain information from the Fourth Amendment's
protections, it did not expose every part of the information contained in
the cell phone." 24 Considering the "tremendous storage capacity of cell
phones and the broad range of types of information that cell phones gen-
erally contain,"12 5 the Eleventh Circuit adopted the file approach to the
private search doctrine as applied to computers, deepening the circuit
split.126
Currently, under the reasonable expectation of privacy definition,
two circuit courts subscribe to the physical device framework,127 which
holds that a search of a single file on a computer means the entire com-
puter has been searched. Two other federal circuit courts subscribe to a
file framework,128 which essentially holds that the opening of a file con-
stitutes a distinct search. In light of the sharp division among these feder-
al circuit courts, the private search doctrine in computer searches is ripe
for Supreme Court review. In fact, in two of the four aforementioned




120. Id. at 1331.
121. Id. at 1331-32.
122. Id. at 1335-37.
123. Id. at 1335.
124. Id. at 1336.
125. Id.
126. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
127. See United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 464 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Rann v.
Atchison, 689 F.3d 832, 838 (7th Cir. 2012).
128. See Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d 478, 491 (6th Cir. 2015); see also United States v. Sparks,
806 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2015).
129. Rann v. Atchison, 133 S. Ct. 672 (2012); Sparks v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2009 (2016).
130. Atchison, 133 S. Ct. at 672 (denying petition for certiorari); Sparks, 136 S. Ct. at 2009
(denying petition for certiorari).
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C. The Death of the Private Search Doctrine after Jones
In 2012-forty-five years after Katz and twenty-eight years after
Jacobsen-the U.S. Supreme Court rendered a landmark decision that
has raised doubts concerning the viability of the private search doctrine.
In United States v. Jones, the Court reintroduced the trespass test for
what constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.131 The Court held that the
police officers' physical installation of a GPS device on defendant Jones'
car was a trespass against Jones' personal effects.13 2 This physical intru-
sion-or trespass-constituted a search per se.'33 The trespass test, re-
vived by Jones, requires (1) trespass34 on (2) a constitutionally protected
area3 5 (3) "conjoined with . . . an attempt to find something or to obtain
information." 36 General Fourth Amendment scholarship teaches that
courts utilized the trespass test throughout American history until the
1960sl37 when Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz v. United
138States introduced the two-part expectation-of-privacy inquiry. In the
years following the Katz decision (in which electronic eavesdropping on
a public telephone booth was held to be a search), the vast majority of
search and seizure case law has shifted away from that approach founded
on property rights and towards an approach based on a person's expecta-
tion of privacy.139 According to Justice Scalia's majority opinion in
Jones, the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test merely supple-
mented the pre-Katz trespass test.140
The reintroduction of the Jones trespass test jeopardizes the viabil-
ity of Jacobsen.141 In Jacobsen, the chemical testing of narcotics that
resulted in the destruction of a "trace amount" of cocaine was not a
search because it failed to reveal more significant information.142 The
reasoning in Jacobsen focused only on the reasonable expectation of
privacy-the sole test to determine whether a government action was a
search when the case was decided.143 However, by applying the Jones
trespass test, "the destruction of only a 'trace amount' of private proper-
131. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404-05 (2012); see also Orin S. Kerr, The Curious
History ofFourth Amendment Searches, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 67, 87-91 (2013).
132. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 404-05.
133. Id.
134. Id at 406.
135. See id.
136. Id. at 408 n.5.
137. See id. at 405 ("[O]ur Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass,
at least until the latter half of the 20th century.").
138. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (explaining the
subjective expectation of privacy and the objective expectation of privacy).
139. Jones, 565 U.S. at 406.
140. See id. at 409 ("[T]he Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not
substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.").
141. See United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1307 (10th Cir. 2016) (noting that Jacob-
sen has an "uncertain status" after Jones).
142. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123, 125-26 (1984).




ty" may now be considered a trespass-to-chattels.144 In fact, even though
the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy was exhausted when
the FedEx employees initially opened the package, the government
agents' replicated search of the package in Jacobsen would be consid-
ered a trespass under Jones. Under such a theory, the outcome in Jacob-
sen would have been different because destroying the trace amount of
powder would have constituted a trespass and, therefore, a search for
Fourth Amendment purposes. Ultimately, the property interests protected
under Jones are more robust than the privacy interests protected under
Jacobsen because a person's property rights are not eroded when a pri-
vate party searches (i.e., trespasses) the property. Indeed, a prior private
search is completely irrelevant to the Jones trespass inquiry.
In the context of computer searches, the private search doctrine's
continuing role after Jones is questionable. Consider the following fact
pattern. Suppose a private party accesses a defendant's computer while
the defendant is away at work and uncovers incriminating files. The pri-
vate party notifies the police, and a police officer arrives at the defend-
ant's residence. The police officer asks the private party to recreate the
search that the private party previously conducted so that the officer
could view the incriminating files. Because the private party is now an
actor under the direction of a police officer, the moment the private party
physically touches the computer to begin recreating the prior search is
arguably a trespass under Jones. Admittedly, under such a broad defini-
tion of trespass, 145 it is hard to imagine a scenario where the govern-
ment's recreation of a prior private search of a computer does not amount
to a trespass under Jones.
Although Jones does not explicitly overrule Jacobsen, it does limit
the applicability of the private search doctrine to Katz-based reasona-
ble-expectation-of-privacy searches.146 As the Jones Court articulated,
"Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katz formula-
tion." 47 In brief, current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence now has two
independent inquiries regarding the definition of a search. Under Katz,
the sole question is whether the government action invaded an individu-
al's reasonable expectation of privacy.148 Under Jones, the inquiry is
whether the government action constitutes a trespass on a constitutional-
ly protected area for the purpose of gathering information. 149 As a result,
cases involving government actions that did not constitute a search under
Katz and Jacobsen may have constituted a search under Jones. With this
144. Ackerman, 831 F.3d at 1307-08.
145. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 425 (Alito, J., concurring) ("But under the Court's reasoning,
[trivial contact with personal property] may violate the Fourth Amendment.").
146. Id. at 407-09 (noting that "the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added
to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test") (majority opinion).
147. Id. at 406.
148. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J. concurring).
149. Jones, 565 U.S. at 406-07.
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background, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit decided
United States v. Ackerman.
II. UNITED STATES V. ACKERMAN
A. Facts
AOL, Inc., implements "an automated filter designed to thwart the
transmission of child pornography."150 This image detection filtering
process (IDFP) scans images sent, saved, or forwarded from an AOL
email account.'5 ' Additionally, AOL possesses a database of hundreds of
thousands of hash values corresponding to pictures meeting the defini-
tion of child sexual images.152 A hash value is "a short string of charac-
ters generated from a much larger string of data (say, an electronic im-
age) using an algorithm-and calculated in a way that makes it highly
unlikely another set of data will produce the same value."'5 3 AOL's IDFP
compares the images scanned from emails with the images in the data-
base.15 4 If a hash value match is detected, AOL captures the email and
prevents the message from sending.'5 5 AOL also deactivates the user's
email account and, pursuant to statutory requirement,156 forwards the
email with its attachments to the National Center for Missing and Ex-
ploited Children (NCMEC) through a tool called the CyberTipline.5 1
CyberTipline was launched in 1998 as a way for online users,
members of the public, and internet service providers to report suspected
child sexual exploitation. Reports can be made online or through the
hotline number.159 Once a report is made with the NCMEC, an analyst
opens the file to determine if it meets the definition of child sexual abuse
images.o NCMEC then utilizes the internet protocol (IP) address and
email address of the user to determine the geographic location of the
user.i16 NCMEC then alerts law enforcement agents in that geographic
162area.
150. United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1294 (2016).
151. United States v. Ackerman, No. 13-10176-01-EFM, 2014 WL 2968164, at *1-2 (D. Kan.
July 1, 2014), rev'd, 831 F.3d 1292, 1292 (10th Cir. 2016).
152. Id.
153. Ackerman, 831 F.3d at 1294; see also Richard P. Salgado, Fourth Amendment Search and
the Power of the Hash, 119 HARV. L. REv. 38, 38-40 (2005).
154. Ackerman, 2014 WL 2968164 at *2.
155. Id.
156. 18 U.S.C. § 2258A(h)(4) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 5773(b)(P)-(Q) (2012).
157. Ackerman, 831 F.3d at 1294.
158. CyberTipline, NAT'L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILD.,
http://www.missingkids.org/cybertipline (last visited Mar. 30, 2017).
159. Id.





On April 22, 2013, AOL's IDFP detected a hash value match on
one of defendant Ackerman's four outgoing email attachments.163 The
aforementioned process was triggered.164 AOL forwarded a report to
NCMEC with the four attached images.1 65 An NCMEC analyst opened
the email along with all four of the attachments.1 66 No warrant was ob-
tained by NCMEC. NCMEC confirmed that all four images met the
definition of child pornography and determined that the defendant's loca-
tion was Kansas. 168 NCMEC then alerted law enforcement agents in the
area, and a special agent obtained a warrant to search Ackerman's resi-
dence while Ackerman was at work, finding "multiple digital items that
revealed the presence of child pornography."'69 A federal grand jury then
indicted Mr. Ackerman on charges of possession and distribution of child
pornography.170
B. Procedural History
The U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas rejected Acker-
man's argument that the email and its attachments were "obtained
through an illegal search and seizure"'7 ' and, therefore, denied Acker-
man's motion to suppress the evidence.172 The district court specifically
rejected Ackerman's arguments to employ a three-part test from the First
Circuitl 73 and instead relied on the test the Tenth Circuit articulated in
United States v. Souza 174: "A search by a private person becomes a gov-
ernment search if the government coerces, dominates, or directs the ac-
tions of a private person conducting the search."75 "To determine
whether a search by a private person becomes a government search, there
is a two-part inquiry: '1) whether the government knew of and acqui-
esced in the intrusive conduct, and 2) whether the party performing the
search intended to assist law enforcement efforts or to further his own
ends. '176
Because a law enforcement agent was not present when NCMEC
conducted its search, the district court found that a law enforcement
163. United States v. Ackerman, No. 13-10176-01-EFM, 2014 WL 2968164, at *3 (D. Kan.
July 1, 2014), rev'd, 831 F.3d 1292, 1292 (10th Cir. 2016).
164. Ackerman, 831 F.3d at 1294.
165. Id
166. Id
167. Id. at 1294-95.
168. Id. at 1294.





173. Id. at *6-7 (citing United States v. Keith, 980 F. Supp. 2d 33, 40 (D. Mass. 2013)).
174. United States v. Souza, 223 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2000).
175. Ackerman, 2014 WL 2968164 at *5, *7 (citing id at 1201).
176. Id. at *5 (quoting Souza, 223 F.3d at 1201).
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agent did not direct NCMEC.1 7 7 Furthermore, the district court held that
NCMEC is a private, non-profit corporation. 178 Alternatively, the district
court held that even if NCMEC was considered a government actor,
NCMEC did not exceed the scope of AOL's initial search "in such a way
that would be constitutionally significant."1 79
Two questions were on appeal to the Tenth Circuit.180 First, "[D]oes
NCMEC qualify as a governmental entity or agent?"'8 Second, if
NCMEC does qualify as a governmental entity or agent, "did NCMEC
simply repeat or did it exceed the scope of AOL's investigation?" 82
C. Tenth Circuit Opinion
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit disagreed with the
district court on both counts.1 83 In the first section of the opinion, the
Tenth Circuit concluded that NCMEC qualifies as the government for
Fourth Amendment purposes.'84 Judge Gorsuch, writing for the court,
relied on NCMEC's two authorizing statutes'8 and recent Supreme
Court decisions'86 to support this argument.
Even if the Tenth Circuit was wrong in determining that NCMEC is
a governmental entity, the court held that NCMEC acted as an agent for
the government in this particular case.'87 Judge Gorsuch returned to the
Tenth Circuit's two-part inquiry under Souzal8 8 but concluded that re-
gardless of which circuit court test is applied, "it's hard to see how we
could avoid deeming NCMEC the government's agent in this case." 89
In the third part of the opinion, the Tenth Circuit held that if
NCMEC is considered a government entity or agent, its actions still im-
plicated the Fourth Amendment, specifically because the actions did not
fall within the scope of the private search doctrine.'9 0 Judge Gorsuch
initially pointed out that "[n]o one in this appeal disputes that email is a
'paper' or 'effect' for Fourth Amendment purposes, a form of communi-
cation capable of storing all sorts of private and personal details, from
correspondence to images, video or audio files, and so much more."'91
However, because the district court assumed that Mr. Ackerman had a
177. Id. at *7, *10.
178. Id. at *8.
179. Id. at *8, *10.
180. United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1294-95 (2016).
181. Id. at 1295.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1299.
185. Id. at 1296-97.
186. Id. at 1297-98 (drawing comparisons between NCMEC and Amtrak).
187. Id. at 1300-04.
188. United States v. Souza, 223 F.3d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 2000).
189. Ackerman, 831 F.3d at 1301-02.
190. Id. at 1304-08.
191. Id. at 1304.
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reasonable expectation of privacy and decided to not analyze the Su-
preme Court's so-called "third-party doctrine,"'9 2 the Tenth Circuit de-
clined to reach the broad issue of whether emails are protected under the
Fourth Amendment.'93
Nevertheless, the government argued on appeal that the private
search doctrine compelled a ruling in its favor.194 The Tenth Circuit re-
jected this argument, noting that "AOL never opened the email itself." 95
AOL only scanned the email and images, found a positive hash-value
comparison on one of the attachments with its internal database, and
forwarded the email and attachments to NCMEC.1 9 6 Applying Jacob-
sen's private search doctrine, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that there
was no virtual certainty that the email itself and the other three attach-
ments contained child pornography.'97 "Indeed, when NCMEC opened
Mr. Ackerman's email it could have learned any number of private and
protected facts . . . ."198 Because NCMEC's search "could have revealed
something previously unknown about noncontraband items," a Fourth
Amendment search exceeding the scope of the initial search took
place.'99
In Section B of the third part of the opinion, the Tenth Circuit
reached the same conclusion regarding the private search doctrine, but
under a different line of reasoning: the United States v. Jones trespass
test.200 Section B of the third part of this opinion, which was joined only
by Judge Phillips and not Judge Hartz,2 0' concluded that when NCMEC
opened Ackerman's email message it constituted a physical intrusion or
trespass into Ackerman's papers or effects under the Jones trespass
test.202 Not only did Judge Gorsuch call into question the continuing via-
bility of United States v. Jacobsen,203 but he also noted that "many courts
have already applied the common law's ancient trespass to chattels doc-
trine to electronic . . . communications."20 4 Simply stated, regardless of
whether the court applies the Jacobsen and Katz reasona-
ble-expectation-of-privacy standard or the Jones trespass-to-chattels test,
192. Id. at 1304-05.
193. Id.
194. Id at 1305.
195. Id. at 1305-06.
196. Id. at 1306.
197. Id. at 1305-06.
198. Id. at 1306.
199. Id.
200. Ackerman, 831 F.3d at 1307-08.
201. Id at 1294.
202. Id. at 1307-08.
203. Id. at 1307.
204. Id. at 1308 (citing eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1063, 1069-70
(N.D. Cal. 2000); CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1019, 1027 (S.D.
Ohio 1997); Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1559, 1565-67 (1996)).
2017] 669
DENVER LAWREVIEW
the result is the same: "NCMEC conducted a 'search' when it opened
and examined Mr. Ackerman's email."205
III. ANALYSIS
A. Ackerman's Alternative Holding is Binding
Briefly, Section B of the third part of the opinion is important not
only for its "puzzling" and "far-reaching implications"2 0 6 with regard to
the Jones trespass test and the viability of Jacobsen and Katz,20 7 but also
because this section serves as an "alternative holding."208 Alternative
holdings are binding on the Tenth Circuit,209 which means that the appli-
cation of the Jones trespass test is no longer limited to what is generally
considered physical and tangible property.210
B. The Jones Trespass Test Applies to "Virtual" 2 11 Property
United States v. Jones produced significant uncertainty among legal
scholars regarding exactly what kind of test it creates.2 12 The first Su-
preme Court case applying the Jones trespass test after Jones itself was
Florida v. Jardines.2 13 With Justice Scalia writing for the majority, the
Court found that when the police officers were gathering information in
the "curtilage of the house," they physically entered and intruded into a
constitutionally protected area.214 Some scholars have suggested that
after Jardines the Jones trespass test only applies to the physical intru-
205. Id.
206. See Orin Kerr, Tenth Circuit: Accessing Email is a 'Search' Under the Jones Trespass
Test, WASH. POST (Aug. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2016/08/09/tenth-circuit-accessing-email-is-a-search-under-the-jones-trespass-test.
207. See discussion supra Section I.C and discussion infra Section III.B.
208. See Chinua Asuzu, JUDICIAL WRITING: A BENCHMARK FOR THE BENCH 134 (2016) ("Al-
ternative holdings are separate and independent grounds for a decision.").
209. See Surefoot LC v. Sure Foot Corp., 531 F.3d 1236, 1243 (10th Cir. 2008) ("Alternative
rationales such as this, providing as they do further grounds for the Court's disposition, ordinarily
cannot be written off as dicta.").
210. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012) ("It is important to be clear about what
occurred in this case: The Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of
obtaining information. We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been considered
a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted." (citing Entick v.
Carrington (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.)) (emphasis added). Even though the property is not
limited to only physical and tangible assets, the trespass itself must be physical per Jones.
211. From a physics perspective, there is no such thing as "virtual" objects. All "virtual" elec-
tronic data is tangible because it exists in computer memory in the form of magnetic particles (i.e.,
electrons). See, e.g., C. Claiborne Ray, The Weight of Memory, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/25/science/25qna.html.
212. See Kerr, supra note 131, at 90-93; see also Marc J. Blitz, The Fourth Amendment Future
of Public Surveillance: Remote Recording and Other Searches in Public Space, 63 AM. U. L. REV.
21, 26-32 (2013); see also Susan Freiwald, The Four Factor Test (2013) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with the University of San Francisco); see also US v. Jones, From Jones to Drones: How to
Define Fourth Amendment Doctrine for Searches in Public, YouTUBE (June 24,
2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-_pGCWZGdqO8.
213. 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
214. Id. at 1414.
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215sion of property, not virtual property2. However, if courts define elec-
tronic communications, such as emails and text messages, as an individ-
ual's papers or effects under the Fourth Amendment,2 16 then a police
officer who intrudes into those spaces without a warrant is intruding into
a constitutionally protected area. Simply because emails, text messages,
and other electronic forms of communications are not physically tangible
in the sense that an individual cannot physically touch or hold them-
absent printing the electronic communications on physical paper-does
not mean that such electronic communications lack the necessary "physi-
cal" aspect of the Jones trespass test. For a computer, most electronic
data is physically stored on a hard disk drive.217 A traditional hard disk
drive is a physical and tangible object comprised of a spinning disk or
disks with magnetic coatings and heads that can read or write magnetic
information.218 These read-write headS219 record binary numbers as a
series of tiny physical areas on the disc that are magnetized either north
or south (i.e., O's and 1'S).220 "As the disk spins, a laser is either reflected
or not reflected by a series of tiny mirrored sections on the disk."2 21 Al-
ternatively, a more modem solid-state drive (SSD) does not rely on mov-
ing parts or spinning disks, but instead relies on flash memory.222 A
charged electron corresponds to a "0," whereas an uncharged electron
corresponds to a "1" in bit code.223 Electrons are physical atoms that
have mass.224 Thus, when the government accesses electronic data, it
physically intrudes on papers or effects under the Fourth Amendment
because the government is obtaining information by physically extracting
215. See Orin Kerr, What is the State of the Jones Trespass Test After Florida v. Jardines?,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (March 27, 2013, 2:56 AM), http://volokh.com/2013/03/27/what-is-the-state-
of-the-jones-trespass-test-after-florida-v-jardines/ ("[P]erhaps the Jones test is not about the techni-
calities of trespass doctrine but rather about physical intrusion into property.").
216. See United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1307-08 (2016).
217. ANDREW S. TANENBAUM & HERBERT Bos, MODERN OPERATING SYSTEMS 281, 300 (4th
ed. 2015) ("File systems are stored on disks.").
218. Hard Disk, PC MAG.: ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/44079/hard-disk (last visited Mar. 30, 2017).
219. Read/Write Head, PC MAG.: ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/50247/read-write-head (l st visited Mar. 30, 2017).
220. See id.; see also Timothy Smithee, How is Data Stored in a Computer?, TECHWALLA,
https://www.techwalla.com/articles/how-is-data-stored-in-a-computer (last visited Mar. 30, 2017);
see also JAMES R. PARKER, PYTHON: AN INTRODUCTION TO PROGRAMMING Ch. 5 (Mercury Learn-
ing & Information, 2016) ("Magnets have two orientations; they have a North Pole and a South Pole.
Current flowing one way will create a magnet in the disk that has a North Pole appearing before the
South Pole, or an N-S mark. Current flowing the other direction through the head will create a mag-
net on the disk that has the South Pole appearing before the North Pole, or an S-N mark. One orien-
tation, say N-S, will represent a binary number 'I,' and the other (S-N) will represent a '0.' In this
way, binary numbers can be written to the surface of the moving disk.").
221. See id.
222. Joel Hruska, How Do SSDs Work?, EXTREMETECH (May 3, 2017, 3:23 AM),
https://www.extremetech.com/extreme/210492-extremetech-explains-how-do-ssds-work.
223. Id.
224. 1 electron = 9 x 10 ' kg. Fundamental Physical Constants, NIST REFERENCE ON




the binary data that is physically encoded onto a physical hard disk drive
with magnetic coatings or electrons.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently elabo-
rated upon the Jones trespass test by establishing a two-part inquiry225
Triggering a Jones trespass requires (1) confirming "possession of the
property in question" and (2) establishing "the ability to exclude others
from entrance onto or interference with that property."226 In the context
of electronic data, the first step of the Seventh Circuit's inquiry poses an
initial problem: if an individual's data is accessed on a government hard
disk drive (e.g., a private party sends the data to the government on its
own volition), who has possession of the property? By adhering to the
aforementioned principles regarding the physical nature of electronic
data, this problem is solved by recognizing property rights within data
itself. Not only does this solution comport with the first step of the Sev-
enth Circuit's inquiry, but it also agrees with the physical characteristics
of the Jones test. An individual's copied data on a government-owned
hard disk drive is still property of the individual under the data-rights
theory. Furthermore, even if a court disregarded the physical properties
of electronic data, such an interpretation does not vex the Jones test be-
cause accessing the data (i.e., the "property") still requires entrance into a
physical space, such as a physical hard disk drive, random access
memory (RAM), solid state drive, or memory chip commonly found in
USB keys, SD cards, MP3 players, and cell phones.22 7 Accessing data
will always require physical intrusion into a physical space, regardless of
how physically small that space may be.228
The second step in the Seventh Circuit's inquiry is easily satisfied in
the context of electronic data. For example, a closed laptop computer
would satisfy the second step because it is closed for the purpose of ex-
cluding others from opening the laptop and accessing the data therein.
More robust examples of excluding others "from entrance onto or inter-
ference with" data include standard login passwords, two-factor authen-
tication protocols,229 fingerprint recognition, and verification codes.230
225. United States v. Sweeney, 821 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2016).
226. Id.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 217-30.
228. See Magnetic Storage, PC MAG.: ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/46497/magnetic-storage (last visited Mar. 13, 2017) ("In
the digital world, information is recorded by writing tiny spots (bits) of negative or positive polarity
on tapes and disks.").
229. See Two-Factor Authentication, PC MAG.: ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/53279/two-factor-authentication (last visited Mar. 30,
2017).
230. See Eric Griffith, Two-Factor Authentication: Who Has It and How to Set It Up, PC MAG.
(Mar. 10, 2017), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2456400,00.asp.
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In short, the Jones trespass-to-chattels standard23 1 is not hindered
when applied to virtual property because (1) electronic data is stored in
physical spaces; (2) electronic data is only accessed by intruding into the
physical area where the electronic data is stored; and (3) electronic data
commands a physical property right within itself.
C. Applying Jones to Ackerman
Returning to Ackerman, Judge Gorsuch failed to explain why the el-
ements of the Jones trespass-to-chattels tort were satisfied in this particu-
lar case.232 Rather, he simply relied on an analogy between the ordinary
postal system and email, assuming that he analogy speaks for itself.233
234Although email and regular mail are analogous, the details of why the
elements of trespass are satisfied in this case should be clarified. First,
the test articulated by the Tenth Circuit states "that government conduct
can constitute a Fourth Amendment search .. . when it involves a physi-
cal intrusion (a trespass) on a constitutionally protected space or thing
('persons, houses, papers, and effects') for the purpose of obtaining in-
formation."2 35 Applying this standard to the facts and drawing from the
aforementioned reasoning in Section B, Ackerman possessed a physical
property right within the data of the email itself. Thus, although AOL
copied the email with all of its data and forwarded it to NCMEC,
Ackerman's property right in the data still existed. Furthermore, even
though NCMEC supposedly stored Ackerman's email on its own physi-
cal storage device(s), Ackerman still retained a physical property right in
the data itself. Next, NCMEC's act of opening Ackerman's email and
thereby exposing his electronic data constituted a physical intrusion into
a constitutionally protected space or thing, namely papers and effects. As
previously mentioned, the act of opening electronic data requires a phys-
ical intrusion into a physical space on a physical memory device.236
Thus, (1) possession of the property is established by finding a property
right within the data itself, and (2) physical intrusion into that property is
established by the act of impermissibly opening the email file that resides
on a physical memory device containing the data, regardless if the sus-
pect has physical possession of that particular memory device.
231. United States v. Jones, 556 U.S. 400, 404-07 (2012).
232. See United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1307-08 (10th Cir. 2016).
233. Id. at 1308 ("[A] more obvious analogy from principle to new technology is hard to imag-
ine . . . .").
234. See Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment o the Internet: A General Approach,
62 STAN. L. REv. 1005, 1023 (2010).
235. Ackerman, 831 F.3d at 1307.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 217-30.
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D.' The File Approach and the Reasonable Expectation ofPrivacy
The majority of data located on a computer or other electronic de-
vice resides in a structure called a "filesystem."237 A filesystem simply
describes the way in which files are named and where they are placed
logically for storage and retrieval among the hard disk drive, RAM, and
external memory devices.238 A file is simply a collection of data or in-
formation and serves as a computer's primary storage unit.23 9 With this
technical backdrop in mind, a simple framework for determining a per-
son's reasonable expectation of privacy can be derived: When a file is
opened on a computer, no reasonable expectation of privacy exists with
regard to that opened file; when a file is closed on a computer, a reason-
able expectation of privacy attaches with regard to that closed file. The
file approach adequately comports with the reasonable expectation of
privacy doctrine.
In the context of physical and tangible searches, a house is searched
when a government agent enters it,240 and a package is searched when a
government agent opens it.241 Individuals should have a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in their personal files just as individuals have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in their home and packages. A person's
data in a file is his or her private property and should be treated no dif-
ferently than other privately sealed containers.2 42 Since a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the container,243
opening the container and seeing the contents constitutes a distinct
Fourth Amendment search and violates the reasonable expectation of
privacy. Applying these same foundational principles to computers, a
closed file is analogous to a closed container, whereas an opened file is
analogous to an opened container. Similarly, the act of double-clicking to
open a previously unopened file is analogous to the act of physically
opening a closed container. As demonstrated, the file approach accurate-
ly corresponds to the physical world notions of Fourth Amendment
searches. "A computer is akin to a virtual warehouse of private infor-
mation,"244 and accordingly, a single file stored in a computer's hard
drive is akin to a single container or box stored inside the warehouse.
There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in an already-opened con-
237. TANENBAUM, supra note 217, at 264.
238. Id at 42, 264.
239. Id at 264.
240. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 610 (1999).
241. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822-23 (1982).
242. See United States v. Bias, No. 90-CR-162, 1990 WL 265179, at *21 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 4,
1990) ("[A]n individual has the same expectation of privacy in a pager, computer or other electronic
data storage and retrieval device as in a closed container . . .
243. Id.




tainer just as there should be no reasonable expectation of privacy in an
already-opened file.
Alternative methodologies to the file approach yield imbalanced re-
sults. For example, consider the physical device approach, which states
that once a single file has been searched on an electronic device, the en-
tire electronic device no longer commands a reasonable expectation of
privacy.245 In the age of cloud technology and remote servers, a group of
physical storage devices in a data warehouse can house files belonging to
hundreds of millions of individuals.2 46 Thus, absurd outcomes would be
inevitable if looking at one file on a remote server meant that the entire
server had been searched, and therefore, the government could analyze
all the files stored on that server, allowing unrestricted access to poten-
tially millions of documents belonging to other people. Such a problem is
also compounded by the current debate as to whether cloud-based data
247even deserves Fourth Amendment protections initially. As suggested
in Ackerman248 and previously proposed in Section C,249 the Fourth
Amendment should track the individual's data, not the physical device
where the data is stored.
Although not as obvious as the physical device approach, concerns
also exist with the human observation approach.250 The human observa-
tion approach advocates that the scope of a computer search should be
limited to "whatever information appears on the output device."251 "Un-
der this approach, scrolling down a word processing file to see parts of
the file that were previously hidden is a distinct search of the rest of the
file."2 52 However, this would imply that the zone of a computer search
could be oddly defined, for example, by the "zoom" tool for a document.
Zooming out of the document would allow more pages of the document
to be displayed on the screen, whereas zooming in to the document
would allow less pages to be displayed. Similarly, the human observation
standard yields odd results regarding pixilated images. A person could
easily enhance a blurry image displayed on a screen by adjusting the
image size (e.g., increasing screen resolution or pixel volume).253 In both
examples, the human observation standard is uncertain. In the document
245. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26, 127.
246. See, e.g., Drew & Arash, Celebrating Half a Billion Users, DROPBOx BLOG (Mar. 7,
2016), https://blogs.dropbox.com/dropbox/2016/03/500-million.
247. See Aaron J. Gold, Obscured by Clouds: The Fourth Amendment and Searching Cloud
Storage Accounts Through Locally Installed Software, 56WM. & MARY L. REV. 2321, 2325 (2015);
see also Ryan Watzel, Riley's Implications for Fourth Amendment Protection in the Cloud,
124 YALE L.J.F. 73, 73-74 (2014).
248. See supra text accompanying notes 183-205.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 232-36.
250. See Kerr, supra note 244, at 556.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 556-57.
253. A similar issue arises when considering thumbnail images because thumbnails are usually
smaller and less clear than full images. See, e.g., Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d 478, 480-81 (6th Cir.
2015) (addressing thumbnails, which are smaller versions of the file's images).
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example, the government technically "observed" the document, but he
extent of the observation was tied to the "zoom" tool. In the picture ex-
ample, the government technically "observed" the picture, but the extent
of the observation was tied to the resolution of the image. Such ambigui-
ties will likely spawn unnecessary obstacles during litigation.
The best definition for the zone of a computer search is the file. As
previously stated, individuals should have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their personal files. Using a file as the zone of a computer
search eliminates several of the complications that accompany both the
physical device approach and the human observation approach. Most
importantly, the file approach comports with the reasonable expectation
of privacy doctrine and is easy to apply: When a file is opened on a com-
puter, no reasonable expectation of privacy exists with regard to that
opened file; when a file is closed on a computer, a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy attaches with regard to that closed file.
E. The File Approach and Trespass
When a file is opened on a computer, a series of complicated physi-
cal steps occur.2 54 First, the filesystem code is invoked to read raw bytes
from the disk and interprets those byte patterns as a tree of files and di-
255rectories. The filesystem then translates a user instruction such as
"Open file X" into individual machine-readable input/output instruc-
tions.256 The input/output instructions use the built-in capabilities of the
processor chip257 and the motherboard controller258 to send and receive
electrical signals on a wire going to the physical drive. On the other end
of this wire, the disk's firmware2 59 interprets the electrical signals and
then accesses the physical data through methods such as spinning the
platters and moving the magnetic heads or reading a flash ROM
cell. 26 1 The method necessary to access the desired data depends on the
type of storage device housing the data.262 Notwithstanding the type of
storage device housing the data or where the data is located on that stor-
age device, in order to access any type of data, a device must always
execute physical actions of sending and receiving electrical signals.
254. TANENBAUM, supra note 217, at 288.
255. See id.
256. See id. ("machine-readable" meaning bit code (i.e., O's and 1's)).
257. Id. at 21 (describing the central processing unit as the "brain" of the computer).
258. Id. at 34 (motherboard contains low-level input/output software, "including procedures to
read the keyboard, write to the screen, and do disk I/O, among other things").
259. Id. at 893 (software that is loaded on PCs by the manufacturer and "persists in memory").
260. Id. at 27 ("A disk consists of one or more metal platters that rotate at 5400, 7200, 10,800
RPM or more.").
261. Flash Memory, PC MAG.: ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/43272/flash-memory (last visited Mar. 30, 2017) (defin-
ing "flash memory" and noting their replacement of spinning platters).
262. See TANENBAUM, supra note 217, at 1025.
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By using this technical foundation and recognizing a unique proper-
ty right within data itself, a trespass of an electronic device should be
defined by opening a file rather than broadly defined as any physical
manipulation of the device (e.g., merely touching the device would con-
stitute a trespass under Jones). Adopting this narrower definition of tres-
pass produces two clear benefits. First, the private search doctrine as
applied to computers can be preserved. A police officer who recreates the
exact prior private search is no longer hindered by the "trivial" 263 nuanc-
es of physically touching a computer that would otherwise constitute a
trespass under Jones.26 4 Specifically, a police officer would be allowed to
touch, scroll, and click on a computer during the recreation of the prior
private search without triggering a trespass, as long as new files that
were previously closed during the prior search are not opened.
Secondly, by focusing on the file as opposed to the physical device;,
a trespass can now occur even if the suspect's data is not accessed on the
suspect's computer. Consider Ackerman: If a trespass was defined as a
physical intrusion on the physical device, then the government's access
of Ackerman's email would not technically be a trespass because AOL
captured the email and forwarded that data to NCMEC. 265 NCMEC did
not obtain a warrant to search through Ackerman's data,266 but nonethe-
less, under a definition of trespass that only focuses on physical intru-
sions of the physical device, NCMEC would not have triggered a unique
Fourth Amendment search under the trespass-to-chattels definition be-
cause it did not access the data on Ackerman's physical device. Con-
versely, this problem is solved by couching the definition of trespass in
the unit of a computer file. Regardless of where the data was accessed, a
trespass occurred the moment NCMEC opened Ackerman's files without
a warrant.2 67 The "chattel" that is trespassed is the data, not the electronic
device where the data is stored.
A main critique of the file approach is that "much information
stored on a computer does not appear in a file." 268 This is a baseless con-
cern because the information on a computer that is technically not stored
in a file per se is stored physically in magnetic strings of 0's and I's on a
disk.269 In other words, the information not stored in a file cannot be read
by humans without first converting that information into a file of some
sort. Moreover, by adopting a broad definition of file,270 a coherent ar-
263. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 425 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) ("But under
the Court's reasoning, [trivial contact with personal property] may violate the Fourth Amendment.").
264. Id. at 424-25 (Alito, J., concurring).
265. See supra text accompanying notes 150-70.
266. See supra text accompanying notes 150-70.
267. See supra text accompanying notes 150-70.
268. Kerr, supra note 244, at 557.
269. See supra text accompanying notes 217-30.
270. See supra text accompanying note 246.
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gument could be made that the collection of physical information stored
on a disk is still considered a file.
The Fourth Amendment trespass-to-chattels earch doctrine as ap-
plied to electronic devices should be defined by files and not physical
devices. A file is directly analogous to real property because the file
structure itself represents the "fence" of the property, and the data con-
tained within the file represents the land and other possessions contained
within the fence. The conceptual framework is simple: opening a file is
271akin to crossing the fence of real property.
F. The File Approach in Practice
Another reason for adopting the file approach is that the actions of
opening and closing a file trigger clear physical movements within the
hard drive of a computer that are corroborated by timestamp metadata.272
When an analyst takes a mouse, clicks, and scrolls down the file to see
parts of the file not previously exposed, no other files or information
273contained outside of the already-opened file are copied to the RAM,
and the standard metadata in the file is not altered.274 Thus, maintaining
the integrity of the human observation standard becomes problematic
because few alternative sources of evidence exist to prove whether an
analyst "scrolled through" or "zoomed in on" a document or image, es-
pecially without some type of "saved state" operation.2 75 Additionally,
adhering to a physical-device-based definition of trespass is also prob-
lematic because few alternative sources of evidence exist to prove
whether or not an analyst touched a computer, opened a laptop, and
scrolled through a document. Fortunately, the file approach is supple-
mented by several accountability mechanisms built-in to most electronic
devices.276 For example, a timestamp is recorded when a file is opened or
271. See, e.g., Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d 478, 480-81 (6th Cir. 2015) (illustrating that the act
of clicking on a thumbnail to open the file constitutes a distinct search); see also United States v.
Sparks, 806 F.3d 1323, 1330-31 (11th Cir. 2015) (concluding that an officer opening a previously
unopened file is a distinct search).
272. TANENBAUM , supra note 217, at 956 ("The standard information field contains the file
owner, security information, the timestamps needed .... ).
273. Id. at 433 ("To scroll a window, the CPU (or controller) must move all the lines of text
upward by copying their bits from one part of the video RAM to another.").
274. See id. at 271 (explaining that standard metadata attributes do not include state infor-
mation).
275. Id. at 829 (describing the Android OS that provides a "saved state" operation and explain-
ing that "[t]he saved state for an activity is generally small, containing for example where you are
scrolled in an email message, but not the message itself, which will be stored elsewhere by the
application in its persistent storage").
276. See, e.g., Whitson Gordon, How to Find Out if Someone's Secretly Been Using Your
Computer, LIFEHACKER (Jan. 5, 2012, 4:30 PM), http://lifehacker.com/5873538/how-to-find-out-if-
someones-secretly-been-using-your-computer; see also Matthew Panzarino, Paranoid? Here 's How





closed.277 When a file is saved and closed, it is stored to a specific parti-
tion on the hard drive disk, which alters the metadata in the file.2 7 8 In
short, an analyst who double clicks to open a file is doing something
fundamentally different than an analyst who simply scrolls through an
already-opened file. The former's actions are far more ascertainable and
concrete, whereas the latter's actions will result in frivolous uncertainties
that lack other means of authentication. Using the file as the unit of
measurement to define a computer search is the superior approach.
Most importantly, lawyers will be able to more adequately advocate
these issues on behalf of their clients. Because courts will be analyzing
the open/close timestamps of files on a storage device,279 discovery and
introduction of evidence is straightforward. Although law enforcement
officers may still be able to testify about what they "opened" or what
they "saw" during the reconstructive search, more weight should be giv-
en to the more objective evidence located on the storage devices. Addi-
tionally, the file approach removes many of the abstract technicalities of
computer functionality because lawyers, judges, and analysts will only
be concerned with whether a particular file was "open" or "closed." Un-
der a human observation approach of the reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy definition,280 many cases would require the consultation of technical
experts to attempt to reconstruct the exact portions of the file that were
exposed on the screen, even if those portions of the files were captured
for only a nanosecond and no metadata record of them was retained. For-
tunately, equipped with the more well-defined file standard, judges will
be able to more adequately render appropriate decisions under both the
reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine281 and the trespass-to-chattels
doctrine.282 A possible bright-line rule emerges from the file approach
that comports with both definitions of a Fourth Amendment search: As
established by a timestamp and metadata analysis, accessing a file that is
already-opened is not a Fourth Amendment search. However, opening a
previously-closed file triggers a unique Fourth Amendment search in the
absence of a warrant.
CONCLUSION
As technology continues to rapidly evolve, more complications will
inevitably arise regarding the Fourth Amendment's application to com-
puters and other electronic devices. Within the last two decades, two
277. TANENBAUM, supra note 217, at 271 ("The various times keep track of when the file was
created, most recently ac[Icessed, and most recently modified.").
278. Id. at 272-73 ("A disk is written in blocks, and closing a file forces writing of the file's
last block. . . .").
279. See infra text accompanying note 286.
280. See supra text accompanying notes 250-53.
281. See supra text accompanying notes 237-53.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 254-73.
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circuit courts have adopted a concerning physical device approach,2 83
whereas three other circuit courts have adopted a more stringent file ap-
proach.284 The deepening split among the federal circuit courts with re-
gard to the private search doctrine's application to computers makes this
issue ripe for Supreme Court review in the imminent future. Moreover,
the re-emergence of the JoneS285 trespass test further confounds existing
Fourth Amendment doctrine. Thus, once the opportunity arises, it is im-
perative for the Supreme Court to articulate a viable and consistent
framework that is flexible enough to adapt to the ever-changing digital
landscape.
The file approach is the most viable, consistent, and flexible frame-
work with regard to Fourth Amendment computer searches. All pro-
grams and human-readable data on a computer are contained in a file,
from Microsoft Word documents (.DOC files) to JPEG images (.JPG
files) to executable applications (.EXE files).286 In fact, the architectural
underpinnings of computer storage are built upon the concept of a file
287system. Unless the underlying hardware of electronic devices and
computers abruptly departs from the foundational file and file system
data structures, the file approach to Fourth Amendment computer search-
es will remain a clear and steadfast framework for generations to come.
Roderick O'Dorisio*
283. See United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 463-464 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Rann v.
Atchison, 689 F.3d 832, 837 (7th Cir. 2012).
284. See Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d 478, 491 (6th Cir. 2015); see also United States v. Sparks,
806 F.3d 1323, 1335 (11th Cir. 2015); see also United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1304-08
(10th Cir. 2016).
285. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406-07 (2012).
286. TANENBAUM, supra note 217, at 4 (noting that all operating systems contain files in order
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287. Id. at 41 ("Another key concept supported by virtually all operating systems is the file
system.").
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